Trade & Economics
Three shipping alliances — 2M, Ocean Alliance, THE Alliance — controlled over 80% of east-west container capacity through 2024. Lars Jensen at Vespucci Maritime has tracked the 2025 reshuffle after MSC announced its exit from 2M. The post-2025 structure is less concentrated by alliance, more by carrier.
MSC's exit from 2M is not deregulation. It is one carrier deciding it no longer needs a partner to operate at scale.
Top-3 carrier market share on Asia-Europe trade lane: 47% in 2018, 53% in 2024 (Drewry Maritime Research).
Trade & Economics
AfCFTA entered force on 1 January 2021. The 2026 five-year mark is a useful checkpoint. The trade-flow data shows what has moved (payment infrastructure, customs harmonisation), what hasn't (services, labour mobility), and where the structural constraints really sit.
AfCFTA's biggest achievements are infrastructure, not tariff lines. That is also its biggest problem.
Intra-African trade: 14.4% of total African trade in 2021, 17.2% in 2025 (UNECA).
Trade & Economics
Since December 2019 the WTO's Appellate Body has been non-functional after the US blocked all new appointments. Gregory Shaffer at UC Irvine has tracked the institutional consequences. The question is no longer whether the system can be restored, but what it is being replaced with.
When a panel ruling can be appealed into nothing, the ruling becomes optional. The optionality is corrosive in slow ways.
WTO disputes filed 2020-2024: 47; appealed into the void: 32 (WTO Dispute Settlement Data, 2024).
April 27, 2026
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Trade & Economics
Kevin Gallagher's team at Boston University's Global Development Policy Center has tracked Chinese overseas development finance since 2008. Their 2023 ten-year retrospective on the Belt and Road found the program peaked in 2016 and has been quietly restructuring ever since.
The Belt and Road Western analysts argue about today is mostly the project portfolio of 2013-2018. The current program is smaller, greener, and far more cautious.
Chinese policy-bank overseas lending: $75B in 2016, ~$3B in 2021, $4.5B in 2023 (BU GDP Center China Loans to Developing Countries DB).
April 17, 2026
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Trade & Economics
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Mariana Mazzucato and Dani Rodrik approach industrial policy from different starting points — Mazzucato from a mission-driven state-capacity framework, Rodrik from a development-economics tradition. Their convergence on the post-2020 industrial-policy moment is more interesting than their differences.
Industrial policy is back. The interesting question is no longer whether, but on what theory — and most of the post-2020 measures are operating without a clear theory at all.
OECD-tracked national industrial policy announcements, 2018-2024: more than 2,500 active measures across 90 jurisdictions (OECD Industrial Policy Tracker, 2024).
March 31, 2026
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Trade & Economics
Wamkele Mene, the AfCFTA secretariat's secretary-general, and Carlos Lopes at the University of Cape Town's Mandela School have written the clearest accounts of where the African Continental Free Trade Area has actually moved since 2021. The progress is real, slower than billed, and structurally constrained by infrastructure rather than tariffs.
Removing tariffs is the easy part. Building the customs, transport, and payment plumbing that makes a tariff cut operational is the next twenty years of African economic diplomacy.
AfCFTA Guided Trade Initiative shipments since 2022: 31 products, 8 countries, no reliable trade-volume figure yet (AfCFTA Secretariat, 2024).
March 26, 2026
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Trade & Economics
In 2023 EU leaders replaced "decoupling" with "de-risking". The word change matters: de-risking means selective diversification in critical sectors, not a wholesale break. The implementation is uneven and slow.
Germany cannot decouple from China at the speed Washington would like, because German industry isn't built that way.
EU goods trade with China: €739B in 2023 — over twice US-China bilateral trade
February 12, 2026
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Trade & Economics
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Chinese policy-bank lending to African sovereigns peaked in 2016 at $28.4B and has fallen below $5B annually since 2020. The 2022-2025 wave of African debt distress tested Beijing's preferred restructuring approach. The G20 Common Framework verdict is still being drafted.
Chinese debt has become a smaller and more contested share of African external obligations, not the larger one Western commentary keeps assuming.
Chinese sovereign lending to Africa, 2016: $28.4B. 2024: $4.6B (Boston University GDP Center).
January 30, 2026
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Trade & Economics
India's May 2022 wheat export ban, imposed days after officials said exports would help fill the Black Sea supply gap, became a case study in food-export protectionism. The International Food Policy Research Institute, with Joachim von Braun's earlier framework, tracked the cascade across 23 countries that followed.
Each country's export ban is rational for that country. The aggregate of rational national choices is a global price spike.
Countries imposing new food-export restrictions May 2022 to December 2022: 23 (IFPRI Food Export Restrictions Tracker).
January 20, 2026
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Trade & Economics
Shannon K. O'Neil, vice president of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of *The Globalization Myth* (Yale, 2022), has tracked North American economic integration since the original NAFTA period. The 2026 USMCA review is the first stress test of the agreement Donald Trump renegotiated in his first term.
USMCA was negotiated for one political coalition. It is being reviewed by a different one. The review clause was designed to either confirm the agreement or kill it. Confirmation requires consent.
US-Mexico bilateral trade (2023): $798B, surpassing US-China trade for the second consecutive year (US Census Bureau; O'Neil 2024 CFR brief).
January 18, 2026
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Trade & Economics
The Peterson Institute's 2024 evaluation, led by Robert Lawrence, found the CHIPS Act has triggered $400B in announced semiconductor investment but only a fraction is leading-edge. Most announced fabs are mature-node — useful, but not what the policy advertised.
The Act did not buy leading-edge sovereignty. It bought a much deeper domestic mature-node base, which may matter more for industrial resilience than the headline suggested.
CHIPS Act direct subsidies committed by mid-2024: $32.5B; private investment announced: ~$400B (PIIE, Lawrence 2024).
January 5, 2026
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