Glossary

Hegemonic stability theory

The argument that the world economy works best when one dominant state — a hegemon — is willing to underwrite open trade, lender-of-last-resort liquidity, and a stable reserve currency. Robert Gilpin developed the political-economy version of the theory in *War and Change in World Politics* (1981); Charles Kindleberger had earlier argued in *The World in Depression* (1973) that the inter-war collapse happened in part because Britain could no longer play the stabiliser role and the United States was not yet willing to. The theory predicts that as the hegemon's relative economic weight declines, its capacity to absorb shocks for the system also declines — and the system becomes more crisis-prone unless a successor or a coalition takes over the stabilising functions. Critics, including Susan Strange and later Daniel Drezner, argue the theory overweights material capabilities and underweights the institutional and ideological work that goes into making rules stick. The framework is the analytical backdrop for current debates about whether the United States is still willing to play the role the post-1945 system was designed around — a question the *Chip War* and CHIPS Act analyses on this site both turn on.